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Abstract. In [14,15], a new methodology has been proposed which al-
lows to derive uniform characterizations of different declarative semantics
for logic programs with negation. One result from this work is that the
well-founded semantics can formally be understood as a stratified version
of the Fitting (or Kripke-Kleene) semantics. The constructions leading
to this result, however, show a certain asymmetry which is not readily
understood. We will study this situation here with the result that we
will obtain a coherent picture of relations between different semantics
for normal logic programs.
1 Introduction
Within the past twenty years, many different declarative semantics for
logic programs with negation have been developed. Different perspectives
on the question what properties a semantics should foremost satisfy, have
led to a variety of diverse proposals. From a knowledge representation
and reasoning point of view it appears to be important that a semantics
captures established non-monotonic reasoning frameworks, e.g. Reiters
default logic [24], and that they allow intuitively appealing, i.e. “common
sense”, encodings of AI problems. The semantics which, due to common
opinion by researchers in the field, satisfy these requirements best, are the
least model semantics for definite programs [18], and for normal programs
the stable [11] and the well-founded semantics [26]. Of lesser importance,
albeit still acknowledged in particular for their relation to resolution-
based logic programming, are the Fitting semantics [8] and approaches
based on stratification [2,22].
The semantics just mentioned are closely connnected by a number of
well- (and some lesser-) known relationships, and many authors have con-
tributed to this understanding. Fitting [10] provides a framework using
⋆⋆ The author acknowledges support by the German Federal Ministry for Education
and Research (BMBF) under the SmartWeb project, and by the European Union
under the KnowledgeWeb Network of Excellence.
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Belnap’s four-valued logic which encompasses supported, stable, Fitting,
and well-founded semantics. His work was recently extended by Denecker,
Marek, and Truszczynski [4]. Przymusinski [23] gives a version in three-
valued logic of the stable semantics, and shows that it coincides with the
well-founded one. Van Gelder [25] constructs the well-founded semantics
unsing the Gelfond-Lifschitz operator originally associated with the sta-
ble semantics. Dung and Kanchanasut [6] define the notion of fixpoint
completion of a program which provides connections between the sup-
ported and the stable semantics, as well as between the Fitting and the
well-founded semantics, studied by Fages [7] and Wendt [28]. Hitzler and
Wendt [14,15] have recently provided a unifying framework using level
mappings, and results which amongst other things give further support
to the point of view that the stable semantics is a formal and natural
extension to normal programs of the least model semantics for definite
programs. Furthermore, it was shown that the well-founded semantics can
be understood, formally, as a stratified version of the Fitting semantics.
This latter result, however, exposes a certain asymmetry in the con-
struction leading to it, and it is natural to ask the question as to what
exactly is underlying it. This is what we will study in the sequel. In a
nutshell, we will see that formally this asymmetry is due to the well-
known preference of falsehood in logic programming semantics. More im-
portantly, we will also see that a “dual” theory, obtained from prefering
truth, can be stablished which is in perfect analogy to the close and well-
known relationships between the different semantics mentioned above.
We want to make it explicit from the start that we do not intend to
provide new semantics for practical purposes1. We rather want to focus
on the deepening of the theoretical insights into the relations between
different semantics, by painting a coherent and complete picture of the
dependencies and interconnections. We find the richness of the theory
very appealing, and strongly supportive of the opinion that the major
semantics studied in the field are founded on a sound theoretical base.
Indeed, from a mathematical perspective one expects major notions in a
field to be strongly interconnected, and historic developments show that
such foundational underpinnings are supportive of a wide and lasting
impact of a field. The results in this paper aim at establishing these
foundations in a clean and formally satisfying manner.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce no-
tation and terminology needed for proving the results in the main body
of the paper. We will also review in detail those results from [14,15] which
1 Although there may be some virtue to this perspective, see [12].
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triggered and motivated our investigations. In Section 3 we will provide
a variant of the stable semantics which prefers truth, and in Section 4
we will do likewise for the well-founded semantics. Throughout, our def-
initions will be accompanied by results which complete the picture of
relationships between different semantics.
This paper is a revised version of the conference contribution [13].
Acknowledgements. I am grateful for comments by anonymous referees
which helped to improve the presentation, and in particular for bringing
my attention to the related and independent work reported in [3,5].
2 Preliminaries and Notation
A (normal) logic program is a finite set of (universally quantified) clauses
of the form ∀(A← A1 ∧ · · · ∧An ∧ ¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bm), commonly written
as A← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm, where A, Ai, and Bj , for i = 1, . . . , n
and j = 1, . . . ,m, are atoms over some given first order language. A is
called the head of the clause, while the remaining atoms make up the body
of the clause, and depending on context, a body of a clause will be a set of
literals (i.e. atoms or negated atoms) or the conjunction of these literals.
Care will be taken that this identification does not cause confusion. We
allow a body, i.e. a conjunction, to be empty, in which case it always
evaluates to true. A clause with empty body is called a unit clause or
a fact. A clause is called definite, if it contains no negation symbol. A
program is called definite if it consists only of definite clauses. We will
usually denote atoms with A or B, and literals, which may be atoms or
negated atoms, by L or K.
Given a logic program P , we can extract from it the components of a
first order language, and we always make the mild assumption that this
language contains at least one constant symbol. The corresponding set of
ground atoms, i.e. the Herbrand base of the program, will be denoted by
BP . For a subset I ⊆ BP , we set ¬I = {¬A | A ∈ BP }. The set of all
ground instances of P with respect to BP will be denoted by ground(P ).
For I ⊆ BP ∪¬BP , we say that A is true with respect to (or in) I if A ∈ I,
we say that A is false with respect to (or in) I if ¬A ∈ I, and if neither
is the case, we say that A is undefined with respect to (or in) I. A (three-
valued or partial) interpretation I for P is a subset of BP ∪ ¬BP which
is consistent, i.e. whenever A ∈ I then ¬A 6∈ I. A body, i.e. a conjunction
of literals, is true in an interpretation I if every literal in the body is true
in I, it is false in I if one of its literals is false in I, and otherwise it is
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undefined in I. For a negated literal L = ¬A we will find it convenient
to write ¬L ∈ I if A ∈ I. By IP we denote the set of all (three-valued)
interpretations of P . Both IP and BP ∪ ¬BP are complete partial orders
(cpos) via set-inclusion, i.e. they contain the empty set as least element,
and every ascending chain has a supremum, namely its union. A model of
P is an interpretation I ∈ IP such that for each clause A← body we have
that body ⊆ I implies A ∈ I. A total interpretation is an interpretation
I such that no A ∈ BP is undefined in I.
For an interpretation I and a program P , an I-partial level mapping
for P is a partial mapping l : BP → α with domain dom(l) = {A | A ∈
I or ¬A ∈ I}, where α is some (countable) ordinal. We extend every level
mapping to literals by setting l(¬A) = l(A) for all A ∈ dom(l). A (total)
level mapping is a total mapping l : BP → α for some (countable) ordinal
α.
Given a normal logic program P and some I ⊆ BP ∪¬BP , we say that
U ⊆ BP is an unfounded set (of P ) with respect to I if each atom A ∈ U
satisfies the following condition: For each clause A← body in ground(P )
(at least) one of the following holds.
(Ui) Some (positive or negative) literal in body is false in I.
(Uii) Some (non-negated) atom in body occurs in U .
Given a normal logic program P , we define the following operators on
BP ∪ ¬BP . TP (I) is the set of all A ∈ BP such that there exists a clause
A ← body in ground(P ) such that body is true in I. FP (I) is the set of
all A ∈ BP such that for all clauses A← body in ground(P ) we have that
body is false in I. Both TP and FP map elements of IP to elements of IP .
Now define the operator ΦP : IP → IP by
ΦP (I) = TP (I) ∪ ¬FP (I).
This operator is due to [8] and is well-defined and monotonic on the cpo
IP , hence has a least fixed point by the Knaster-Tarski
2 fixed-point the-
orem, and we can obtain this fixed point by defining, for each monotonic
2 We follow the terminology from [16]. The Knaster-Tarski theorem is sometimes called
Tarski theorem and states that every monotonic function on a cpo has a least fixed
point, which can be obtained by transfinitely iterating the bottom element of the
cpo. The Tarski-Kantorovitch theorem is sometimes refered to as the Kleene theorem
or the Scott theorem (or even as “the” fixed-point theorem) and states that if the
function is additionally Scott (or order-) continuous, then the least fixed point can
be obtained by an iteration which is not transfinite, i.e. closes off at ω, the least
infinite ordinal. In both cases, the least fixed point is also the least pre-fixed point
of the function.
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operator F , that F ↑0 = ∅, F ↑(α+ 1) = F (F ↑α) for any ordinal α, and
F ↑ β =
⋃
γ<β F ↑ γ for any limit ordinal β, and the least fixed point of
F is obtained as F ↑α for some ordinal α. The least fixed point of ΦP is
called the Kripke-Kleene model or Fitting model of P , determining the
Fitting semantics of P .
Now, for I ⊆ BP ∪ ¬BP , let UP (I) be the greatest unfounded set (of
P ) with respect to I, which always exists due to [26]. Finally, define
WP (I) = TP (I) ∪ ¬UP (I)
for all I ⊆ BP ∪ ¬BP . The operator WP , which operates on the cpo
BP ∪ ¬BP , is due to [26] and is monotonic, hence has a least fixed point
by the Knaster-Tarski2 fixed-point theorem, as above for ΦP . It turns out
that WP ↑ α is in IP for each ordinal α, and so the least fixed point of
WP is also in IP and is called the well-founded model of P , giving the
well-founded semantics of P .
In order to avoid confusion, we will use the following terminology:
the notion of interpretation, and IP will be the set of all those, will by
default denote consistent subsets of BP∪¬BP , i.e. interpretations in three-
valued logic. We will sometimes emphasize this point by using the notion
partial interpretation. By two-valued interpretations we mean subsets of
BP . Both interpretations and two-valued interpretations are ordered by
subset inclusion. Each two-valued interpretation I can be identified with
the partial interpretation I ′ = I∪¬(BP \I). Note however, that in this case
I ′ is always a maximal element in the ordering for partial interpretations,
while I is in general not maximal as a two-valued interpretation3. Given a
partial interpretation I, we set I+ = I∩BP and I
− = {A ∈ BP | ¬A ∈ I}.
Given a program P , we define the operator T+P on subsets of BP by
T+P (I) = TP (I∪¬(BP \I)). The pre-fixed points of T
+
P , i.e. the two-valued
interpretations I ⊆ BP with T
+
P (I) ⊆ I, are exactly the models, in the
sense of classical logic, of P . Post-fixed points of T+P , i.e. I ⊆ BP with I ⊆
T+P (I) are called supported interpretations of P , and a supported model
of P is a model P which is a supported interpretation. The supported
models of P thus coincide with the fixed points of T+P . It is well-known
that for definite programs P the operator T+P is monotonic on the set
of all subsets of BP , with respect to subset inclusion. Indeed it is Scott-
continuous [18,1] and, via the Tarski-Kantorovich2 fixed-point theorem,
achieves its least pre-fixed point M , which is also a fixed point, as the
supremum of the iterates T+P ↑ n for n ∈ N. So M = lfp
(
T+P
)
= T+P ↑ ω
3 These two orderings in fact correspond to the knowledge and truth orderings as
discussed in [9].
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is the least two-valued model of P . Likewise, since the set of all subsets
of BP is a complete lattice, and therefore has greatest element BP , we
can also define T+P ↓ 0 = BP and inductively T
+
P ↓ (α + 1) = T
+
P (T
+
P ↓α)
for each ordinal α and T+P ↓ β =
⋂
γ<β T
+
P ↓ γ for each limit ordinal β.
Again by the Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem, applied to the superset
inclusion ordering (i.e. reverse subset inclusion) on subsets of BP , it turns
out that T+P has a greatest fixed point, gfp
(
T+P
)
.
The stable model semantics due to [11] is intimately related to the
well-founded semantics. Let P be a normal program, and let M ⊆ BP
be a set of atoms. Then we define P/M to be the (ground) program
consisting of all clauses A ← A1, . . . , An for which there is a clause
A ← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in ground(P ) with B1, . . . , Bm 6∈ M .
Since P/M does no longer contain negation, it has a least two-valued
model T+P/M ↑ ω. For any two-valued interpretation I we can therefore
define the operator GLP (I) = T
+
P/I ↑ ω, and call M a stable model of
the normal program P if it is a fixed point of the operator GLP , i.e. if
M = GLP (M) = T
+
P/M ↑ω. As it turns out, the operator GLP is in gen-
eral not monotonic for normal programs P . However it is antitonic, i.e.
whenever I ⊆ J ⊆ BP then GLP (J) ⊆ GLP (I). As a consequence, the
operator GL2P , obtained by applying GLP twice, is monotonic, and hence
has a least fixed point LP and a greatest fixed point GP . In [25] it was
shown that GLP (LP ) = GP , LP = GLP (GP ), and that LP ∪¬(BP \GP )
coincides with the well-founded model of P . This is called the alternating
fixed point characterization of the well-founded semantics.
Some Results
The following is a straightforward result which has, to the best of our
knowledge, first been formally reported in [15], where a proof can be
found.
Theorem 1. Let P be a definite program. Then there is a unique two-
valued model M of P for which there exists a (total) level mapping l :
BP → α such that for each atom A ∈ M there exists a clause A ←
A1, . . . , An in ground(P ) with Ai ∈ M and l(A) > l(Ai) for all i =
1, . . . , n. Furthermore, M is the least two-valued model of P .
The following result is due to [7], and is striking in its similarity to
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let P be normal. Then a two-valued model M ⊆ BP
of P is a stable model of P if and only if there exists a (total) level
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mapping l : BP → α such that for each A ∈ M there exists A ←
A1, . . . , An¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in ground(P ) with Ai ∈ M , Bj 6∈ M , and
l(A) > l(Ai) for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m.
We next recall the following alternative characterization of the Fitting
model, due to [14,15].
Definition 1. Let P be a normal logic program, I be a model of P , and l
be an I-partial level mapping for P . We say that P satisfies (F) with
respect to I and l, if each A ∈ dom(l) satisfies one of the following
conditions.
(Fi) A ∈ I and there exists a clause A← L1, . . . , Ln in ground(P ) such
that Li ∈ I and l(A) > l(Li) for all i.
(Fii) ¬A ∈ I and for each clause A ← L1, . . . , Ln in ground(P ) there
exists i with ¬Li ∈ I and l(A) > l(Li).
Theorem 3. Let P be a normal logic program with Fitting model M .
Then M is the greatest model among all models I, for which there exists
an I-partial level mapping l for P such that P satisfies (F) with respect
to I and l.
Let us recall next the definition of a (locally) stratified program, due
to [2,22]: A normal logic program is called locally stratified if there exists
a (total) level mapping l : BP → α, for some ordinal α, such that for
each clause A ← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in ground(P ) we have that
l(A) ≥ l(Ai) and l(A) > l(Bj) for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m. The
notion of (locally) stratifed program was developed with the idea of pre-
venting recursion through negation, while allowing recursion through pos-
itive dependencies. (Locally) stratified programs have total well-founded
models.
There exist locally stratified programs which do not have a total Fit-
ting semantics and vice versa — just consider the programs consisting
of the single clauses p ← p, respectively, p ← ¬p, q. In fact, condition
(Fii) requires a strict decrease of level between the head and a literal in
the rule, independent of this literal being positive or negative. But, on
the other hand, condition (Fii) imposes no further restrictions on the re-
maining body literals, while the notion of local stratification does. These
considerations motivate the substitution of condition (Fii) by the condi-
tion (Cii), as done for the following definition.
Definition 2. Let P be a normal logic program, I be a model of P , and
l be an I-partial level mapping for P . We say that P satisfies (WF) with
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respect to I and l, if each A ∈ dom(l) satisfies (Fi) or the following
condition.
(Cii) ¬A ∈ I and for each clause A ← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm
contained in ground(P ) (at least) one of the following conditions
holds:
(Ciia) There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ¬Ai ∈ I and l(A) ≥
l(Ai).
(Ciib) There exists j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with Bj ∈ I and l(A) >
l(Bj).
So, in the light of Theorem 3, Definition 2 should provide a natu-
ral “stratified version” of the Fitting semantics. And indeed it does, and
furthermore, the resulting semantics coincides with the well-founded se-
mantics, which is a very satisfactory result from [14,15].
Theorem 4. Let P be a normal logic program with well-founded model
M . Then M is the greatest model among all models I, for which there
exists an I-partial level mapping l for P such that P satisfies (WF) with
respect to I and l.
For completeness, we remark that an alternative characterization of
the weakly perfect model semantics [21] can also be found in [14,15].
The approach which led to the results just mentioned, originally put
forward in [14,15], provides a general methodology for obtaining uniform
characterizations of different semantics for logic programs.
3 Maximally Circular Stable Semantics
We note that condition (Fi) has been reused in Definition 2. Thus, Defini-
tion 1 has been “stratified” only with respect to condition (Fii), yielding
(Cii), but not with respect to (Fi). Indeed, also replacing (Fi) by a strat-
ified version such as the following seems not satisfactory at first sight.
(Ci) A ∈ I and there exists a clause A← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in
ground(P ) such that Ai,¬Bj ∈ I, l(A) ≥ l(Ai), and l(A) > l(Bj)
for all i and j.
If we replace condition (Fi) by condition (Ci) in Definition 2, then it is not
guaranteed that for any given program there is a greatest model satisfying
the desired properties, as the following example from [14,15] shows.
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Example 1. Consider the program consisting of the two clauses p ← p
and q ← ¬p, and the two (total) modelsM1 = {p,¬q} and M2 = {¬p, q},
which are incomparable, and the level mapping l with l(p) = 0 and l(q) =
1.
In order to arrive at an understanding of this asymmetry, we consider
the setting with conditions (Ci) and (Fii), which is somehow “dual” to
the well-founded semantics which is characterized by (Fi) and (Cii).
Definition 3. Let P be a normal logic program, I be a model of P , and
l be an I-partial level mapping for P . We say that P satisfies (CW) with
respect to I and l, if each A ∈ dom(l) satisfies (Ci) or (Fii).
By virtue of Definition 3 we will be able to develop a theory which
complements the restults from Section 2. We will first characterize the
greatest model of a definite program analogously to Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. Let P be a definite program. Then there is a unique two-
valued supported interpretation M of P for which there exists a (total)
level mapping l : BP → α such that for each atom A 6∈ M and for
all clauses A ← A1, . . . , An in ground(P ) there is some Ai 6∈ M with
l(A) > l(Ai). Furthermore, M is the greatest two-valued model of P .
Proof. Let M be the greatest two-valued model of P , and let α be the
least ordinal such that M = T+P ↓ α. Define l : BP → α by setting
l(A) = min{γ | A 6∈ T+P ↓ (γ + 1)} for A 6∈ M , and by setting l(A) = 0
if A ∈ M . The mapping l is well-defined because A 6∈ M with A 6∈ T+P ↓
γ =
⋂
β<γ T
+
P ↓ β for some limit ordinal γ implies A 6∈ T
+
P ↓ β for some
β < γ. So the least ordinal β with A 6∈ T+P ↓ β is always a successor
ordinal. Now assume that there is A 6∈ M which does not satisfy the
stated condition. We can furthermore assume without loss of generality
that A is chosen with this property such that l(A) is minimal. Let A ←
A1, . . . , An be a clause in ground(P ). Since A 6∈ T
+
P
(
T+P ↓ l(A)
)
we obtain
Ai 6∈ T
+
P ↓ l(A) ⊇M for some i. But then l(Ai) < l(A) which contradicts
minimality of l(A).
Conversely, let M be a two-valued model for P which satisfies the
given condition for some mapping l : BP → α. We show by transfinite
induction on l(A) that A 6∈M implies A 6∈ T+P ↓(l(A) + 1), which suffices
because it implies that for the greatest two-valued model T+P ↓β of P we
have that T+P ↓ β ⊆ M , and therefore T
+
P ↓ β = M . For the inductive
proof consider first the case where l(A) = 0. Then there is no clause
in ground(P ) with head A and consequently A 6∈ T+P ↓ 1 = T
+
P (BP ).
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Now assume that the statement to be proven holds for all B 6∈ M with
l(B) < α, where α is some ordinal, and let A 6∈ M with l(A) = α.
Then each clause in ground(P ) with head A contains an atom B with
l(B) = β < α and B 6∈ M . Hence B 6∈ T+P ↓ (β + 1) and consequently
A 6∈ T+P ↓(α + 1).
The following definition and theorem are analogous to Theorem 2.
Definition 4. Let P be normal. Then M ⊆ BP is called a maximally
circular stable model (maxstable model) of P if it is a two-valued
supported interpretation of P and there exists a (total) level mapping
l : BP → α such that for each atom A 6∈ M and for all clauses
A← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in ground(P ) with B1, . . . , Bm 6∈M there
is some Ai 6∈M with l(A) > l(Ai).
Theorem 6. M ⊆ BP is a maxstable model of P if and only if M =
gfp
(
T+P/M
)
.
Proof. First note that every maxstable model is a a supported model. In-
deed supportedness follows immediately from the definition. Now assume
that M is maxstable but is not a model, i.e. there is A 6∈M but there is
a clause A← A1, . . . , An in ground(P ) with Ai ∈M for all i. But by the
definition of maxstable model we must have that there is Ai 6∈M , which
contradicts Ai ∈M .
Now letM be a maxstable model of P . Let A 6∈M and let T+P/M ↓α =
gfp
(
T+
P/M
)
. We show by transfinite induction on l(A) that A 6∈ T+
P/M
↓
(l(A) + 1) and hence A 6∈ T+P/M ↓α. For l(A) = 0 there is no clause with
head A in P/M , so A 6∈ T+P/M ↓1. Now let l(A) = β for some ordinal β. By
assumption we have that for all clauses A ← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm
with B1, . . . , Bm 6∈M there exists Ai 6∈M with l(A) > l(Ai), say l(Ai) =
γ < β. Hence Ai 6∈ T
+
P/M ↓ (γ + 1), and consequently A 6∈ T
+
P/M ↓ (β + 1),
which shows that gfp
(
T+P/M
)
⊆M .
So let again M be a maxstable model of P and let A 6∈ gfp
(
T+P/M
)
=
T+P/M ↓ α and l(A) = β. Then for each clause A ← A1, . . . , An in P/M
there is Ai with Ai 6∈ T
+
P/M ↓ α and l(A) > l(Ai). Now assume A ∈ M .
Without loss of generality we can furthermore assume that A is chosen
such that l(A) = β is minimal. Hence Ai 6∈ M , and we obtain that for
each clause in P/M with head A one of the corresponding body atoms is
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false in M . By supportedness of M this yields A 6∈M , which contradicts
our assumption. Hence A 6∈M as desired.
Conversely, let M = gfp
(
T+P/M
)
. Then as an immediate consequence
of Theorem 5 we obtain that M is maxstable.
4 Maximally Circular Well-Founded Semantics
Maxstable models are formally analogous4 to stable models in that the
former are fixed points of the operator I 7→ gfp
(
T+P/I
)
, while the latter
are fixed points of the operator I 7→ lfp
(
T+P/I
)
. Further, in analogy to the
alternating fixed point characterization of the well-founded model, we can
obtain a corresponding variant of the well-founded semantics, which we
will do next. Theorem 6 suggests the definition of the following operator.
Definition 5. Let P be a normal program and I be a two-valued inter-
pretation. Then define CGLP (I) = gfp
(
T+P/I
)
.
Using the operator CGLP , we can define a “maximally circular” ver-
sion of the alternating fixed-point semantics.
Proposition 1. Let P be a normal program. Then the following hold.
(i) CGLP is antitonic and CGL
2
P is monotonic.
(ii) CGLP
(
lfp
(
CGL2P
))
= gfp
(
CGL2P
)
and CGLP
(
gfp
(
CGL2P
))
=
lfp
(
CGL2P
)
.
Proof. (i) If I ⊆ J ∈ BP , then P/J ⊆ P/I and consequently CGLP (J) =
gfp
(
T+P/J
)
⊆ gfp
(
T+P/I
)
= CGLP (I). Monotonicity of CGL
2
P then fol-
lows trivially.
(ii) Let LP = lfp
(
CGL2P
)
and GP = gfp
(
CGL2P
)
. Then we can
calculate CGL2P (CGLP (LP )) = CGLP
(
CGL2P (LP )
)
= CGLP (LP ), so
CGLP (LP ) is a fixed point of CGL
2
P , and hence LP ⊆ CGLP (LP ) ⊆ GP .
Similarly, LP ⊆ CGLP (GP ) ⊆ GP . Since LP ⊆ GP we get from the
antitonicity of CGLP that LP ⊆ CGLP (GP ) ⊆ CGLP (LP ) ⊆ GP . Sim-
ilarly, since CGLP (LP ) ⊆ GP , we obtain CGLP (GP ) ⊆ CGL
2
P (LP ) =
LP ⊆ CGLP (GP ), so CGLP (GP ) = LP , and also GP = CGL
2
P (GP ) =
CGLP (LP ).
4 The term dual seems not to be entirely adequate in this situation, although it is
intuitionally appealing.
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We will now define an operator for the maximally circular well-
founded semantics. Given a normal logic program P and some I ∈ IP , we
say that S ⊆ BP is a self-founded set (of P ) with respect to I if S∪I ∈ IP
and each atom A ∈ S satisfies the following condition: There exists a
clause A← body in ground(P ) such that one of the following holds.
(Si) body is true in I.
(Sii) Some (non-negated) atoms in body occur in S and all other literals
in body are true in I.
Self-founded sets are analogous5 to unfounded sets, and the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 2. Let P be a normal program and let I ∈ IP . Then there
exists a greatest self-founded set of P with respect to I.
Proof. If (Si)i∈I is a family of sets each of which is a self-founded set of P
with respect to I, then it is easy to see that
⋃
i∈I Si is also a self-founded
set of P with respect to I.
Given a normal program P and I ∈ IP , let SP (I) be the greatest
self-founded set of P with respect to I, and define the operator CWP on
IP by
CWP (I) = SP (I) ∪ ¬FP (I).
Proposition 3. The operator CWP is well-defined and monotonic.
Proof. For well-definedness, we have to show that SP (I) ∩ FP (I) = ∅ for
all I ∈ IP . So assume there is A ∈ SP (I) ∩ FP (I). From A ∈ FP (I) we
obtain that for each clause with head A there is a corresponding body
literal L which is false in I. From A ∈ SP (I), more precisely from (Sii),
we can furthermore conclude that L is an atom and L ∈ SP (I). But then
¬L ∈ I and L ∈ SP (I) which is impossible by definition of self-founded
set which requires that SP (I) ∪ I ∈ IP . So SP (I) ∩ FP (I) = ∅ and CWP
is well-defined.
For monotonicity, let I ⊆ J ∈ IP and let L ∈ CWP (I). If L = ¬A is
a negated atom, then A ∈ FP (I) and all clauses with head A contain a
body literal which is false in I, hence in J , and we obtain A ∈ FP (J). If
L = A is an atom, then A ∈ SP (I) and there exists a clause A ← body
in ground(P ) such that (at least) one of (Si) or (Sii) holds. If (Si) holds,
then body is true in I, hence in J , and A ∈ SP (J). If (Sii) holds, then
some non-negated atoms in body occur in S and all other literals in body
are true in I, hence in J , and we obtain A ∈ SP (J).
5 Again, it is not really a duality.
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Since Proposition 3 establishes monotonicity of CWP , for normal P ,
we conclude that this operator has a least fixed point lfp(CWP ).
Definition 6. For a normal program P , we call lfp(CWP ) the maximally
circular well-founded model (maxwf model) of P .
The following theorem relates our observations to Definition 3, in per-
fect analogy to the correspondence between the stable model semantics,
Theorem 1, Fages’s characterization from Theorem 2, the well-founded
semantics, and the alternating fixed point characterization.
Theorem 7. Let P be a normal program and MP = lfp(CWP ) be its
maxwf model. Then the following hold.
(i) MP is the greatest model among all models I of P such that there is
an I-partial level mapping l for P such that P satisfies (CW) with
respect to I and l.
(ii) MP = lfp
(
CGL2P
)
∪ ¬
(
BP \ gfp
(
CGL2P
))
.
Proof. (i) Let MP = lfp(CWP ) and define the MP -partial level mapping
lP as follows: lP (A) = α, where α is the least ordinal such that A is not
undefined in CWP ↑(α+1). The proof will be established by showing the
following facts: (1) P satisfies (CW) with respect to MP and lP . (2) If I
is a model of P and l is an I-partial level mapping such that P satisfies
(CW) with respect to I and l, then I ⊆MP .
(1) Let A ∈ dom(lP ) and lP (A) = α. We consider two cases.
(Case i) If A ∈ MP , then A ∈ SP (CWP ↑ α), hence there exists a
clause A ← body in ground(P ) such that (Si) or (Sii) holds with respect
to CWP ↑α. If (Si) holds, then all literals in body are true in CWP ↑α,
hence have level less than lP (A) and (Ci) is satisfied. If (Sii) holds, then
some non-negated atoms from body occur in SP (CWP ↑ α), hence have
level less than or equal to lP (A), and all remaining literals in body are true
in CWP ↑ α, hence have level less than lP (A). Consequently, A satisfies
(Ci) with respect to MP and lP .
(Case ii) If ¬A ∈ MP , then A ∈ FP (CWP ↑α), hence for all clauses
A ← body in ground(P ) there exists L ∈ body with ¬L ∈ CWP ↑α and
lP (L) < α, hence ¬L ∈ MP . Consequently, A satisfies (Fii) with respect
to MP and lP , and we have established that fact (1) holds.
(2) We show via transfinite induction on α = l(A), that whenever
A ∈ I (respectively, ¬A ∈ I), then A ∈ CWP ↑ (α + 1) (respectively,
¬A ∈ CWP ↑ (α + 1)). For the base case, note that if l(A) = 0, then
¬A ∈ I implies that there is no clause with head A in ground(P ), hence
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¬A ∈ CWP ↑ 1. If A ∈ I then consider the set S of all atoms B with
l(B) = 0 and B ∈ I. We show that S is a self-founded set of P with
respect to CWP ↑0 = ∅, and this suffices since it implies A ∈ CWP ↑1 by
the fact that A ∈ S. So let C ∈ S. Then C ∈ I and C satisfies condition
(Ci) with respect to I and l, and since l(C) = 0, we have that there is a
definite clause with head C whose body atoms (if it has any) are all of
level 0 and contained in I. Hence condition (Sii) (or (Si)) is satisfied for
this clause and S is a self-founded set of P with respect to I. So assume
now that the induction hypothesis holds for all B ∈ BP with l(B) < α,
and let A be such that l(A) = α. We consider two cases.
(Case i) If A ∈ I, consider the set S of all atoms B with l(B) = α
and B ∈ I. We show that S is a self-founded set of P with respect to
CWP ↑ α, and this suffices since it implies A ∈ CWP ↑ (α + 1) by the
fact that A ∈ S. First note that S ⊆ I, so S ∪ I ∈ IP . Now let C ∈ S.
Then C ∈ I and C satisfies condition (Ci) with respect to I and l, so
there is a clause A ← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in ground(P ) such that
Ai,¬Bj ∈ I, l(A) ≥ l(Ai), and l(A) > l(Bj) for all i and j. By induction
hypothesis we obtain ¬Bj ∈ CWP ↑α. If l(Ai) < l(A) for some Ai then
we have Ai ∈ CWP ↑ α, also by induction hypothesis. If there is no Ai
with l(Ai) = l(A), then (Si) holds, while l(Ai) = l(A) implies Ai ∈ S, so
(Sii) holds.
(Case ii) If ¬A ∈ I, then A satisfies (Fii) with respect to I and l. Hence
for all clauses A ← body in ground(P ) we have that there is L ∈ body
with ¬L ∈ I and l(L) < α. Hence for all these L we have ¬L ∈ CWP ↑α
by induction hypothesis, and consequently for all clauses A ← body in
ground(P ) we obtain that body is false in CWP ↑ α which yields ¬A ∈
CWP ↑(α + 1). This establishes fact (2) and concludes the proof of (i).
(ii) We first introduce some notation. Let
L0 = ∅, G0 = BP ,
Lα+1 = CGLP (Gα), Gα+1 = CGLP (Lα) for any ordinal α,
Lα =
⋃
β<α
Lβ, Gα =
⋂
β<α
Gβ for limit ordinal α,
LP = lfp(CGL
2
P ), GP = gfp(CGL
2
P ).
By transfinite induction, it is easily checked that Lα ⊆ Lβ ⊆ Gβ ⊆ Gα
whenever α ≤ β. So LP =
⋃
Lα and GP =
⋂
Gα.
Let M = LP ∪¬(BP \GP ). We intend to apply (i) and first define an
M -partial level mapping l. We will take as image set of l, pairs (α, γ) of
ordinals, with the lexicographic ordering. This can be done without loss
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of generality since any set of such pairs, under the lexicographic ordering,
is well-ordered, and therefore order-isomorphic to an ordinal. For A ∈ LP ,
let l(A) be the pair (α, 0), where α is the least ordinal such that A ∈ Lα+1.
For B 6∈ GP , let l(B) be the pair (β, γ), where β is the least ordinal such
that B 6∈ Gβ+1, and γ is least such that B 6∈ TP/Lβ ↓γ. It is easily shown
that l is well-defined, and we show next by transfinite induction that P
satisfies (CW) with respect to M and l.
Let A ∈ L1 = gfp
(
T+P/BP
)
. Since P/BP contains exactly all clauses
from ground(P ) which contain no negation, we have that A is contained
in the greatest two-valued model of a definite subprogram of P , namely
P/BP . So there must be a definite clause in ground(P ) with head A whose
corresponding body atoms are also true in L1, which, by definition of l,
must have the same level as A, hence (Ci) is satisfied. Now let ¬B ∈
¬(BP \ GP ) such that B ∈ (BP \ G1) = BP \ gfp
(
T+P/∅
)
. Since P/∅
contains all clauses from ground(P ) with all negative literals removed, we
obtain that B is not contained in the greatest two-valued model of the
definite program P/∅, and (Fii) is satisfied by Theorem 5 using a simple
induction argument.
Assume now that, for some ordinal α, we have shown that A satisfies
(CW) with respect to M and l for all A ∈ BP with l(A) < (α, 0).
Let A ∈ Lα+1 \ Lα = gfp
(
T+P/Gα
)
\ Lα. Then A ∈
(
T+P/Gα ↓γ
)
\ Lα
for some γ; note that all (negative) literals which were removed by the
Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation from clauses with head A have level less
than (α, 0). Then A satisfies (Ci) with respect to M and l by definition
of l.
Let A ∈ (BP \ Gα+1) ∩ Gα. Then A 6∈ gfp
(
T+P/Lα
)
and we conclude
again from Theorem 5, using a simple induction argument, that A satisfies
(CW) with respect to M and l.
This finishes the proof that P satisfies (CW) with respect to M and
l. It remains to show that M is greatest with this property.
So assume that M1 ⊃ M is the greatest model such that P satisfies
(CW) with respect to M1 and some M1-partial level mapping l1. Assume
L ∈ M1 \M and, without loss of generality, let the literal L be chosen
such that l1(L) is minimal. We consider two cases.
(Case i) If L = ¬A ∈ M1 \M is a negated atom, then by (Fii) for
each clause A ← L1, . . . , Ln in ground(P ) there exists i with ¬Li ∈ M1
and l1(A) > l1(Li). Hence, ¬Li ∈ M and consequently for each clause
A ← body in P/LP we have that some atom in body is false in M =
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LP ∪ ¬(BP \ GP ). But then A 6∈ CGLP (LP ) = GP , hence ¬A ∈ M ,
contradicting ¬A ∈M1 \M .
(Case ii) If L = A ∈M1\M is an atom, then A 6∈M = LP∪¬(BP \GP )
and in particular A 6∈ LP = gfp
(
T+P/GP
)
. Hence A 6∈ T+P/GP ↓ γ for
some γ, which can be chosen to be least with this property. We show by
induction on γ that this leads to a contradiction, to finish the proof.
If γ = 1, then there is no clause with head A in P/GP , i.e. for all
clauses A ← body in ground(P ) we have that body is false in M , hence
in M1, which contradicts A ∈M1.
Now assume that there is no B ∈ M1 \M with B 6∈ T
+
P/GP
↓ δ for
any δ < γ, and let A ∈ M1 \ M with A 6∈ T
+
P/GP
↓ γ, which implies
that γ is a successor ordinal. By A ∈ M1 and (Ci) there must be a
clause A ← A1, . . . , An¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm in ground(P ) with Ai,¬Bj ∈ M1
for all i and j. However, since A 6∈ T+P/GP ↓ γ we obtain that for each
A← A1, . . . , An in P/GP , hence for each A← A1, . . . , An,¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm
in ground(P ) with ¬B1, . . . ,¬Bm ∈ ¬(BP \ GP ) ⊆ M ⊆ M1 there is
Ai with Ai 6∈ T
+
P/GP
↓ (γ − 1) ⊆ M , and by induction hypothesis we
obtain Ai 6∈ M1. So Ai ∈ M1 and Ai 6∈ M1, which is a contradiction and
concludes the proof.
5 Related Work
As the purpose of our paper is to present a coherent unified picture of
different semantics, it is related to the large body of work on relating
semantics and uniform frameworks for semantics of logic programs. For a
subjective selection of the probably most prominent approaches we refer
to the introduction of this paper and also to the extensive discussions
in [15], where the level-mapping approach was introduced and put into
perspective. Two very recent developments, however, appear to be very
closely related to our approach, and we discuss them shortly. They were
both developed independently of our work, and brought to our attention
while this paper was being reviewed.
Loyer, Spyratos and Stamate, in [19], presented a parametrized ap-
proach to different semantics. It allows to substitute the preference for
falsehood by preference for truth in the stable and well-founded seman-
tics, but uses entirely different means than presented here. Its purpose is
also different — while we focus on the strenghtening of the mathematical
foundations for the field, the work in [19] is motivated by the need to deal
with open vs. closed world assumption in some application settings. The
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exact relationship between their approach and ours remains to be worked
out.
Denecker, Bruynooghe, Marek, and Ternovska, in [3,5], unified dif-
ferent logic programming semantics by identifying them as transfinite
inductive definitions. As the latter can also be analysed using fixed-point
computations via semantic operators, our level-mapping proof schema as
described in [15] should be applicable to this inductive perspective as well.
We believe that our approach provides more flexibility and can be more
readily extended to other syntactic and semantic features, but further
work will be needed to substantiate this. On the other hand, the induc-
tive approach appears to be more intuitively appealing at first sight, and
of more general explanatory value.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We have displayed a coherent picture of different semantics for normal
logic programs. We have added to well-known results new ones which
complete the formerly incomplete picture of relationships. The richness of
theory and relationships turns out to be very appealing and satisfactory.
As noted already in the introduction, we did not intend to provide
new semantics for practical purposes. We rather wanted to focus on the
deepening of the theoretical insights into the relations between different
semantics, by painting a coherent and complete picture of their depen-
dencies and interconnections. Nevertheless, our new semantics stands well
in the tradition of the original motivation of non-monotonic reasoning re-
search: our semantics is defined by making a selection of the (classical)
models of a program, understood as first-order logical formulae. We do
not claim that the this line of motivation necessarily carries much further
— as repeatedly stated, our purpose is formal, and foundational.
From a mathematical perspective one expects major notions in a field
to be strongly and cleanly interconnected, and it is fair to say that this
is the case for declarative semantics for normal logic programs, as our
exhibition shows. We would also like to stress that the results presented
in this paper are far from straightforward. Intuitively, replacing least fixed
points by greatest fixed points appears to be unproblematic, but this is
only true on the general conceptual level, and far from obvious, or easy to
achieve, formally. The details of the constructions and proofs are indeed
involved and not incremental, which is particularly obvious by the proof
details for Theorem 7. The fact that a symmetric picture such as the
one presented here can be established at all is strongly supportive of
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the position that major established notions in logic programming are not
only intuitively appealing — this is well-known as intuition was one of
the driving forces in the field — but also formally satisfactory.
For normal logic programs, we have obtained a uniform perspective
on different semantics. The situation becomes much more difficult when
discussing extensions of the logic programming paradigm like disjunctive
[27], quantitative [20], or dynamic [17] logic programming. For many of
these extensions it is as yet to be determined what the best ways of
providing declarative semantics for these frameworks are, and the lack of
interconnections between the different proposals in the literature provides
an argument for the case that no satisfactory answers have yet been found.
We believe that successful proposals for extensions will have to exhibit
similar interrelationships as observed for normal programs. How, and if,
this can be achieved, however, is as yet rather uncertain. Formal studies
like the one in this paper may help in designing satisfactory semantics,
but a discussion of this is outside the scope of our exhibition, and will be
pursued elsewhere.
References
1. Samson Abramsky and Achim Jung. Domain theory. In Samson Abramsky, Dov
Gabbay, and Thomas S.E. Maibaum, editors, Handbook of Logic in Computer Sci-
ence, volume 3. Clarendon, Oxford, 1994.
2. Krzysztof R. Apt, Howard A. Blair, and Adrian Walker. Towards a theory of
declarative knowledge. In Jack Minker, editor, Foundations of Deductive Databases
and Logic Programming, pages 89–148. Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1988.
3. Marc Denecker, Maurice Bruynooghe, and V. Wictor Marek. Logic programming
revisited: logic programs as inductive definitions. ACM Transactions on Compu-
tational Logic, 2(4):623–654, 2001.
4. Marc Denecker, V. Wiktor Marek, and Miroslaw Truszczynski. Approximating op-
erators, stable operators, well-founded fixpoints and applications in non-monotonic
reasoning. In Jack Minker, editor, Logic-based Artificial Intelligence, chapter 6,
pages 127–144. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2000.
5. Marc Denecker and Evgenia Ternovska. A logic of non-monotone inductive def-
initions and its modularity properties. In Vladimir Lifschitz and Ilkka Niemela¨,
editors, Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: 7th International Con-
ference, volume 2923 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 47–60. Springer,
2004.
6. Phan Minh Dung and Kanchana Kanchanasut. A fixpoint approach to declarative
semantics of logic programs. In Ewing L. Lusk and Ross A. Overbeek, editors, Logic
Programming, Proceedings of the North American Conference 1989, NACLP’89,
Cleveland, Ohio, pages 604–625. MIT Press, 1989.
7. Franc¸ois Fages. Consistency of Clark’s completion and existence of stable models.
Journal of Methods of Logic in Computer Science, 1:51–60, 1994.
8. Melvin Fitting. A Kripke-Kleene-semantics for general logic programs. The Journal
of Logic Programming, 2:295–312, 1985.
18
9. Melvin Fitting. Bilattices and the semantics of logic programming. The Journal
of Logic Programming, 11:91–116, 1991.
10. Melvin Fitting. Fixpoint semantics for logic programming — A survey. Theoretical
Computer Science, 278(1–2):25–51, 2002.
11. Michael Gelfond and Vladimir Lifschitz. The stable model semantics for logic
programming. In Robert A. Kowalski and Kenneth A. Bowen, editors, Logic Pro-
gramming. Proceedings of the 5th International Conference and Symposium on
Logic Programming, pages 1070–1080. MIT Press, 1988.
12. Pascal Hitzler. Circular belief in logic programming semantics. Technical Report
WV–02–13, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Group, Artificial Intelli-
gence Institute, Department of Computer Science, Dresden University of Technol-
ogy, Dresden, Germany, 2002.
13. Pascal Hitzler. Towards a systematic account of different logic programming se-
mantics. In Andreas Gu¨nter, Rudolf Kruse, and Bernd Neumann, editors, Proceed-
ings of the 26th German Conference on Artificial Intelligence, KI2003, Hamburg,
September 2003, volume 2821 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 355–
369. Springer, Berlin, 2003.
14. Pascal Hitzler and Matthias Wendt. The well-founded semantics is a stratified
Fitting semantics. In Matthias Jarke, Jana Koehler, and Gerhard Lakemeyer,
editors, Proceedings of the 25th Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, KI2002, Aachen, Germany, September 2002, volume 2479 of Lecture Notes
in Artificial Intelligence, pages 205–221. Springer, Berlin, 2002.
15. Pascal Hitzler and Matthias Wendt. A uniform approach to logic rogramming
semantics. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, 5(1–2):123–159, 2005.
16. Jacek Jachymski. Order-theoretic aspects of metric fixed-point theory. In
William A. Kirk and Brailey Sims, editors, Handbook of Metric Fixed Point The-
ory, pages 613–641. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands,
2001.
17. Joao A. Leite. Evolving Knowledge Bases, volume 81 of Frontiers of Artificial
Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, 2003.
18. John W. Lloyd. Foundations of Logic Programming. Springer, Berlin, 1988.
19. Yann Loyer, Nicolas Spyratos, and Daniel Stamate. Parametrized semantics of
logic programs — a unifying framework. Theoretical Computer Science, 308(1–
3):429–447, 2003.
20. Cristinel Mateis. Quantitative disjunctive logic programming: Semantics and com-
putation. AI communications, 13(4):225–248, 2000.
21. Halina Przymusinska and Teodor C. Przymusinski. Weakly stratified logic pro-
grams. Fundamenta Informaticae, 13:51–65, 1990.
22. Teodor C. Przymusinski. On the declarative semantics of deductive databases and
logic programs. In Jack Minker, editor, Foundations of Deductive Databases and
Logic Programming, pages 193–216. Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1988.
23. Teodor C. Przymusinski. Well-founded semantics coincides with three-valued sta-
ble semantics. Fundamenta Informaticae, 13(4):445–464, 1989.
24. Raymond Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13:81–132,
1980.
25. Allen van Gelder. The alternating fixpoint of logic programs with negation. In
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART Symposium on Prin-
ciples of Database Systems, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, pages 1–10. ACM Press,
1989.
19
26. Allen van Gelder, Kenneth A. Ross, and John S. Schlipf. The well-founded seman-
tics for general logic programs. Journal of the ACM, 38(3):620–650, 1991.
27. Kewen Wang. A comparative study of well-founded semantics for disjunctive logic
programs. In Thomas Eiter, Wolfgang Faber, and Miroslaw Truszczynski, editors,
Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, 6th International Conference,
LPNMR 2001, Vienna, Austria, September 17-19, 2001, Proceedings, volume 2173
of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 133–146. Springer, 2001.
28. Matthias Wendt. Unfolding the well-founded semantics. Journal of Electrical
Engineering, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 53(12/s):56–59, 2002. (Proceedings of
the 4th Slovakian Student Conference in Applied Mathematics, Bratislava, April
2002).
20
